1) A Personal Rapid Transit (PRT)
system was built in Morgantown, WV, in the early 70's.
2) PRT is expensive to build.
3) PRT breaks down frequently.
4) Because no other PRT system
has been built, PRT won't work for us.
What
transportation experts "know" is wrong.
1) A Group Rapid Transit (GRT)
system was built in Morgantown.
2) Compared to LRT, PRT costs 1/3
to build, operate, and maintain.
3) Since 1979, the Morgantown GRT
system has been in continuous service with a 99% reliability factor.
4) Although special interest
groups and transportation "experts" have successfully
derailed PRT efforts in many cities, PRT makes economic,
environmental, social justice, and service sense for Santa Clara
County residents.
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PRT (SkyWeb Express) |
Morgantown GRT |
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Vehicle capacity = 3 seated |
Vehicle capacity = 21 (8
seated, 13 standing) |
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Vehicle Weight (empty) =
1,100 pounds |
Vehicle Weight (empty) =
8,760 pounds |
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Average operating cost per
passenger = $0.15 |
Average operating cost per
passenger = $1.27 |
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Find a good overview article
about the Morgantown GRT at
http://www.progressiveengineer.com/PEWebBackissues2002/PEWeb%2024%20Mar%2002-2/PRT.htm
Return
to PRT Introduction.
Link to
Further Information and Status
of PRT Projects.
www.electric-bikes.com/prt-info.html
Brief analysis
of the Morgantown GRT effort
Opponents (specifically LRT
manufacturer) drag Morgantown into their discussion, again seeming to
hope to convince the reader that a system contracted 34 years ago is
the best we can do now. The Morgantown contract was let in
December 1970 with the stipulation that the system be operational 22
months later - in October 1972 in time to reelect President Nixon.
Here are a few of the problems that ensued:
1. Because of the rush, the
fixed-facility builder F. R. Harris of Stamford, Connecticut, was
told to assume in their calculations that the vehicles would weight
as much as a conventional rapid-rail car, which accounted for the
heavy guideway and stations.
2. Eight months into the program,
the designated system manager, Jet Propulsion Laboratory of Pasadena,
California, resigned from the program because they found that UMTA
was using them only for a money pass-through. They were given
no budget for systems engineering. Boeing took over as system
manager with now only 14 months until the system had to be operational.
3. After Boeing had designed the
vehicle, they found that F. R. Harris had designed curves - too late
to change - so sharp that their vehicle couldn't negotiate them.
In midstream they had to redesign to include back-wheel in addition
to front-wheel steering.
4. UMTA told F. R. Harris that
they had budgeted for borings at only about one post in five.
F. R. Harris insisted that given the mountainous soil conditions in
Morgantown they had to test the soil at every post. A big fight
ensued, which was resolved only by UMTA giving F. R. Harris a memo
taking responsibility for the consequences of the lack of borings.
The foundations and columns were built, following which a number of
them sagged. So at great expense the team had to dig them out,
do the borings, design properly, and reconstruct.
5. In mid program, the team
discovered that it snowed in Morgantown and that operating on a
slippery guideway was not safe. So they laid pipes in the
running surface to carry heated ethylene glycol. Much later, a
student of mine who worked at Boeing on automated guideway systems
showed me data indicating that on an annual basis it took four times
as much energy to melt snow as it did to propel the vehicles.
Notwithstanding all of this and
more, they actually ran a vehicle in October 1972. It stopped
due to a sensor failure with Teresa Nixon in it, and of course that
and the cost over-runs created great press. Over the next
few years, the bugs were worked out and the system has been in daily
operation ever since - with virtually no press. A few years ago
Boeing rebuilt the control system. A visit to Morgantown
and a ride on the system in 1989 convince the Chicago RTA leadership
that PRT would work and that a much lower cost design could be built
provided that the vehicles were kept as small and as light in weight
as possible, and that the guideway would not be over designed as
happened in Morgantown.
As a basis for the Morgantown
system, UMTA select the Alden Starrcar of Bedford, Massachusetts.
They had designed a six-passenger vehicle and their cost estimates
were based on that. The UMTA leadership increased the size to
20 passengers with eight seats. With the increase in size and
all of the problems mentioned above, the cost skyrocketed. Now
AA would like you, dear reader, to believe that this is the best that
can be done 34 years later!
The effect of the Morgantown
project on Congress was to cause them to lose interest in the PRT
concept, and this held back PRT development for at least 15 years.
Development of PRT has required understanding and cooperation among
entities such as cities or high-use developments, investors, and suppliers.
With interest in Congress dropped and the federal government telling
cities not to look at any non-proven technology, it was much more of
a challenge to get all of these people to together, and this is the
major answer to the common question: "Why has it taken so long?"
Link to
Further Information and Status
of PRT Projects.
www.electric-bikes.com/prt-info.html
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